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Corporate governance is an internal control system that is essential for sustainable growth and 
continuous improvements to cater the needs of all parties involved, including investors, 
employees, customers and shareholders. The study of significance of ownership structure to the 
firms’ performance in Malaysia is not done extensively in Malaysia. This study gives a better 
understanding on the issue to strengthen such structures. The corporate governance have been used 
to address the issue of ownership structure. It is stated that corporate governance can reduce the 
conflict of interest among shareholder and management. This paper examines the relationship 
between ownership structure variables and firms’ performance using a sample of 14 firms that listed 
in Bursa Malaysia in finance sector from 2010 to 2014. Firms’ performance is measured using return 
on assets (ROA) while managerial ownership (MO) and foreign ownership (FO) represents ownership 
structure variables. The results from random effects model reveal that the variables are insignificant 
but they have the positive relationship. From these findings, it revealed that managerial ownership 
has a positive impact on performance supported by numerous research that had been done. 
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Introduction 
Corporate governance gives a structure of control systems that help the organization in 
accomplishing its objectives, while avoiding undesirable conflicts. The pillars of corporate governance 
consist of ethical behavior, accountability, transparency, and sustainability are essential to the 
corporate governance. Organization that grasp these standards are bound to deliver long term value 
than those that are lacking in one or all. Corporate governance is not only concern with the investor 
interest but requires adjusting the needs of managements. In addition, the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) presented in 2000 has been a significant tool for corporate 
governance reform and has impacted corporate governance practices of companies positively. The 
MCCG reflects global principles and internationally recognized practices of corporate governance 
which are above and beyond the minimum required by statute, regulations or those prescribed by 
 
